Gilleo owned a house in Ladue,
Missouri. She put up several signs protesting the first Gulf War on her
property. She was informed that a city ordinance prohibited placing signs
in one's yard.
Gilleo applied for a variance to the city ordinance, but was denied. She sued
on the grounds that the ordinance violated the 1st Amendment
right to freedom of speech.
The Trial Court found for
Gilleo and issued an injunction
against the ordinance.
Gilleo placed an anti-war
sign in the window of her home.
The City Council repealed the
ordinance and replaced it with a new one. The new ordinance did not allow
for variances at all.
The ordinance also defined
which types of signs were allowed, for example, most types of commercial
signs were ok.
Gilleo amended her complaint
to challenge the constitutionality of the new ordinance.
The Trial Court held the
ordinance to be unconstitutional. Ladue appealed.
The Appellate Court affirmed.
Ladue appealed.
The Appellate Court found
that the ordinance was invalid as a "content based" regulation
because it treated commercial speech more favorably than noncommercial
speech.
The US Supreme Court affirmed.
The US Supreme Court noted
that municipalities have an interest in signs from a zoning and land use
perspective.
The Court found that there
are two ways in which sign banning can lead to violations of the 1st
Amendment:
Ordinances that ban too
little free speech by using exemptions to discriminate on the basis of
the sign's message.
Ordinances that ban too
much free speech, such as an outright ban on all signs.
The Court found that putting
up signs in one's yard is a very important part of free speech and
Ladue's ordinance banning all signs (which included political campaign
ads) was clearly unconstitutional.
However, the Court did say
that it was possible that you could construct an anti-sign regulation
that wouldn't violate the 1st Amendment.
For example, a regulation
that banned all signs larger than a certain size.
