The Wilderness Society v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service
353 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2003)
Tustumena Lake (within the
Kenai Wildlife Refuge in Alaska) was a salmon spawning ground. In order
to protect salmon populations (and provide greater fishing opportunities
downstream), the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) contracted with a
private, non-profit corporation named CIAA to get salmon eggs from the
lake, grow them in a hatchery, and then return them to the lake to become
delicious adult salmon.
FWS prepared an
Environmental Assessment (EA) that had a finding of no significant
impact.
Wilderness Society sued for an
injunction.
Wilderness Society argued
that the project violated the Wilderness Act (16 U.S.C. §§1131-1136) because it did not preserve the 'natural
conditions' of the lake, and allowed impermissible commercial activity.
FWS argued that no one who
came to the Refuge would even notice that there were more salmon in the
waters, so the project didn't effect the pristine nature of the
wilderness.
The Trial Court found for FWS
and allowed the project. Wilderness Society appealed.
The Trial Court found that
the project was not a 'commercial enterprise'.
The Court found that the
term 'commercial enterprise' in the Wilderness Act §4(b) was ambiguous and wasn't intended to cover
activities like CIAA's.
The Appellate Court affirmed.
Wilderness Society appealed.
The Appellate Court, sitting
en banc reversed and granted the injunction.
The Appellate Court found
that the project was a 'commercial enterprise'.
The Court looked to the
plain language meaning of the term 'commercial enterprise', and looked
the general purposes of the Wilderness Act.
The Court found that the
primary purpose and effect of the program was to advance commercial
interests of fishermen. That's not in line with the purpose of the Wilderness
act.
The Court noted that the Wilderness
Act was very clear and stated that
there shall be "no commercial enterprise" within a designated
wilderness. "This mandatory language does not provide exception to
the prohibition on commercial enterprise within wilderness if aimed at
achieving a benign goal for commerce with modest impact on wilderness."
Compare to Sierra Club v.
Lyng (663 F.Supp. 556 (1987)), where
it was held that the Forest Service was allowed to cut down trees within a
Wilderness Area to protect timber interests outside of the Area from a
beetle infestation.