Braschi and Blanchard were a
gay couple living together in a rent controlled apartment. Blanchard was
the only name on the lease. Blanchard died.
The landlord (Stahl) notified
Braschi that he was to be evicted because it wasn't his apartment.
Braschi filed for a permanent
injunction based on New York City Rent and Eviction Regulations 9 NYCRR
2204.6(d).
9 NYCRR 2204.6(d) says that upon the death of a rent-control
tenant, the landlord may not dispossess "either the surviving spouse
of the deceased tenant or some other member of the deceased tenant's family
who has been living with the tenant."
The Trial Court found for
Braschi. Stahl appealed.
The Trial Court found that
that the long-term interdependent nature of the 10-year relationship
between appellant and Blanchard "fulfills any definitional criteria
of the term 'family.'"
The Appellate Court reversed.
Braschi appealed.
The Appellate Court found
that Braschi was not the spouse or a member of Blanchard's family,
therefore he was not covered by 9 NYCRR 2204.6(d).
The Court found that
2204.6(d) provides noneviction
protection only to "family members within traditional, legally
recognized familial relationships." Since Blanchard and Braschi's
relationship was not given formal recognition by New York State, he
could not be covered.
The New York Supreme Court
reversed the Appellate Court and granted the injunction to Braschi.
The New York Supreme Court
noted that the term family was not
defined in the Statute, and there was no specific reference in the legislative
history to the noneviction provision.
The Court looked to the legislative
purpose underlying the enactment of
the rent-control laws as a whole.
The Court found that it was
reasonable to conclude that, in using the term 'family,' the Legislature
intended to extend protection to those who reside in households having
all of the normal familial characteristics.
The Court failed to
recognize that in the 1940s, when the Act was written, homosexuality
was illegal, nevermind encouraged.
The Court noted that the purpose of the Statute was more important that the language of the Statute.
Stahl unsuccessfully argued
that a different part of the regulation (9 NYCRR 2520.6[o]) defines who is to be covered under the
definition of 'family', but the Court rejected this argument, saying that
it was a totally different provision, so it was irrelevant.
The Court found that
Braschi still had the burden of proof that he and Blanchard were more
than just roommates, so they remanded back to the Trial Court to
determine if there was enough evidence to prove that Braschi and
Blanchard had all the normal familial characteristics.
In a dissent it was argued
that the plain language definition
of a 'family' does not include a gay couple. In addition, the dissent
felt that the majority opinion was against the legislative scheme
underlying the rent control regulation.
The dissent noted that the
term 'family' was used in conjunction with the term 'spouse', and
therefore the two should be read together.
That's an application of Noscitur
a Sociis (it is known from its
associates).
In addition, the dissent
suggests that even though the regulation does not define 'family',
Black's Law Dictionary defines it. So why not use that definition?
The dissent also made a purpose argument, saying that the purpose of the
Statute was to phase itself out over time. Adding more people to the
process will only make the phase out take longer.
In this case, the Court chose
to consider what the legislators would do now based on what they did then. This is different from classic purposivism, which would consider what the legislators
meant then.
The definition of family had changed since the time the Statute was
originally written, so do you interpret the law to encompass the current
definition or the historical definition?
This is known as the meta
intent of the Statute.
Modern legislators could
have passed a law saying that the term family should now encompass gay couples, but they
haven't. Should their silence on the issue make a difference?
