Johnson was protesting outside
the Republican National Convention in Texas. He burned a flag, apparently
offending some onlookers.
Johnson was arrested and
charged with violating a Texas law prohibiting the vandalism of 'respected
objects'.
Johnson was convicted and
sentenced to one year in prison. He appealed.
Johnson argued that flag
burning was a form of speech and
as such the law against flag burning was an unconstitutional infringement
of his 1st Amendment right to free speech.
Texas argued that their compelling
government interests in maintaining
order and in "preserving a venerated national symbol" were
strong enough to justify the infringement.
The Appellate Court upheld the
conviction. Johnson appealed.
The Texas Supreme Court
overturned the conviction. Texas appealed.
The Texas Supreme Court
looked to United States v. O'Brien
(391 U.S. 367 (1968)), performed a balancing test, and found that Texas'
interests were not strong enough to override Johnson's 1st
Amendment rights.
The O'Brien Test asks three questions:
Does the law further an
important or substantial governmental interest,
Is the governmental
interest unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and
Is the incidental
restriction on alleged 1st Amendment freedoms not greater than is essential to
the furtherance of that interest?
The US Supreme Court affirmed.
The US Supreme Court
reiterated that the 1st Amendment covers conduct that communicates,
and not just 'speech.'
However, the Court did
limit the types of conduct covered by the 1st Amendment to situations where "an intent to
convey a particularized message was present," and where "the
likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those who
viewed it."
The Court agreed with the
Texas Supreme Court that, when applying the balancing test of O'Brien, Texas' interests were not compelling enough
to override Johnson's 1st Amendment rights.
Essentially, the Court was
applying a standard strict scrutiny
test.
Texas unsuccessfully argued
that flag burning is because it tends to incite breaches of the peace,
but the Court referred to Brandenburg v. Ohio (395 U.S. 444 (1969)), and found that that
the State may only punish speech that would incite "imminent lawless
action."